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The Iranian Revolutionary Guard

A Research Paper

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The Iranian Revolutionary Guard

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A Research Paper

*Research for this report was completed
on 19 December 1979.*

25X1A The author of this paper is [Redacted] the
Iran Task Force, Office of Political Analysis. [Redacted]

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25X1 This paper was coordinated with the Office of
Strategic Research and the National Intelligence Of-
ficer for the Near East and South Asia. [Redacted]

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**The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard**

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Overview

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has emerged over the past 10 months as a force controlled at all levels by clerics and designed to protect both the Islamic movement and its clerical leaders from all opponents. The Guard is closely tied to Ayatollah Khomeini and works in tandem with his Islamic Republican Party and Revolutionary Courts, with which it shares some of its top leaders. The Guard is intended to help deepen and perpetuate—by force and by proselytizing—the hold of Khomeini's clerical circle on the people.

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Still a ragtag organization nationally, the Guard's elite units in Tehran—called the "main force" in defense of the Islamic movement—outclass the armed leftist groups and the protesters that Khomeini's rivals could raise against him. The regular armed forces—demoralized, understrength, and divided are seen by Khomeini's entourage as a threat. Efforts are under way to restrict their role, reduce their size, and replace their officers with a more reliable cadre

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the Guard is to be expanded, better trained and disciplined, and given more money and equipment. Its present deficiencies in these areas have been largely responsible for its inability to quash dissidence among the ethnic minorities.

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 recruits are to be nominated, or at least well investigated, by local Revolutionary Committees loyal to Khomeini.

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The Guard has not made a good impression on the Iranian people—either Farsi-speaking or ethnic minorities. The brutality and lack of sympathy displayed by the Guard have instead created or exacerbated local disturbances, leading to demands for its withdrawal or reorganization. Repeated efforts by the Khomeini regime to control or purge unreliable Guards have failed. Despite the determination of many of its leaders and troops, the Guard will not for the foreseeable future be able effectively to carry out most of its mission.

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**The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard**

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In the 10 months since Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic movement came to power in Iran, the Revolutionary Guard (*Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Engelab* or simply, *pasdaran*) has become an important force in establishing his Islamic Republic. The Guard has borne the brunt of clashes with several dissident minorities and assumed many routine law enforcement duties

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The Guard has also played an important role at the US Embassy compound in Tehran. Responding to a US request for additional protection, about 100 Guards bolstered irregular security forces at the compound in late May; the Guards finally ousted the irregular group in August. This unit did not oppose the Embassy takeover on 4 November. The pasdaran has been guarding the perimeter of the compound since the early days of the takeover. A deputy commander of the

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in early December that his force bears final responsibility for the safety of the hostages and that they are guarded by Revolutionary Guards "whether they are at the Embassy or

The Guard is also charged with political organization and propagandizing on behalf of the Islamic movement and with assisting in some local development projects. Working closely with and implementing the orders of the Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary Committees at all levels, the Guard has been the most immediate point of daily contact between many citizens and the new regime. Contrary to Khomeini's design, the Guard has generally not made a good impression. Its activities and the attitudes of its members conflict with established local religious, secular, and security force power structures. In many cases, the Guard itself has provoked or intensified dissidence that has required armed intervention by Guard reinforcements. Demands for the withdrawal of Guards who are not members of the local ethnic community and for strict control over Guard recruitment have come not only from ethnic minorities, but also from Farsi-speaking communities. Repeated local and national campaigns—the latest ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini on 11 December—to purge undesirable Guards and control Guard activities have been undertaken.

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The Guard's problems have arisen in part because leaders of the Islamic movement have had little time to develop effective control over or adequately train and supply its units nationwide. In the period between Khomeini's assumption of power in mid-February and the formal announcement of the Guard's existence as an operating force, the Iranian press gradually began grouping under the rubric of *pasdaran* any activities of the many pro-Khomeini militias that seemed consistent with the aims of the new regime. But because a goal of the Guard has been to eradicate vestiges of the Shah's regime and to propagate the ideas of Khomeini's revolution, even when Guard units have acted under specific orders, they have often been seen as a disruptive and oppressive influence by the citizens.

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Revolutionary Guards
marching past the US Embassy
in Tehran. [redacted]

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X1 Development of the Guard has also been set back by the fundamental opposition to the pasdaran concept by most military leaders and secular political officials. These individuals have not wanted the Guard to become an effective force, and although they lacked the power to prevent its formation, they were [redacted]

[redacted] able to hinder its progress somewhat. [redacted]

A more basic, albeit generally behind-the-scenes stumbling block for the Guard organization has been the struggle—which may be continuing—within Khomeini's entourage for ultimate control of the pasdaran. The struggle has been an element of the personal rivalries between and among secular associates of Khomeini—such as Ebrahim Yazdi and Mostafa Chamran—and clerical advisers like Ayatollahs Beheshti, Rafsanjani, and Khamenei. All these individuals recognize that control of a national force, such as the Guard is designed to become, would be a valuable asset to an individual and the interests he represents. Aside from competing personal ambitions, distinctions between the two sides' views may be fluid and subtle. The clerics probably emphasize that clerical control of national institutions is crucial to the proper development of the Islamic Republic. They would argue that the government, the Guard, and the Islamic Republican Party—founded for Khomeini by Beheshti, Rafsanjani, Khamenei, and two other clerics—should be facets of the Islamic movement rather than distinct entities. Beheshti and Rafsanjani were trying in May to bring the pasdaran under the aegis of the party as its "protective arm"; Khamenei said in November that the armed forces would be politicized. Khomeini's secular associates probably prefer the pasdaran to be a more separate, professional organization [redacted]

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Charter and Mission

The text of the new Islamic Constitution provides little insight into the specific mission of the Revolutionary Guard, but it makes clear the determination of the Khomeini regime to establish the pasdaran as a permanent feature of the Islamic Republic. The Constitution's preamble states that the Guard is responsible, along with the Army, not only for defending Iranian territory, but also for "holy war . . . and fighting to expand the rule of God's law in the world." The relevant "principle" in the body of the Constitution states:

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that was formed in the first days of the victory of this revolution will remain active in order to continue its role as the guardian of the revolution and its offshoots. The limit of this force's duty and the scope of its authority in relation to the duties and scope of authority of other armed forces will be defined by law with emphasis on cooperation and brotherly harmony. [redacted]

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The announcement in May of the formation of the Guard and subsequent comments by Guard leaders have provided a more detailed outline of pasdaran duties, which include:

- Training its members in Islamic ideology and politics as well as in military skills and supporting Ayatollah Khomeini's recent call for the militarization of the whole nation by training its citizens.
- Safeguarding the revolution through ideological and political proselytizing and by the examples set by the force and its individual members.
- Aiding the implementation of Revolutionary Court and secular judicial orders and the enforcement of law and order, especially with regard to counterrevolutionaries, leftists, and minorities.
- Defending against attack by foreign military forces or infiltrators.
- Assisting in government-sponsored development projects and eventually assuming full responsibility for a domestic peace-corps-like program.
- Cooperating effectively with the regular armed forces, but maintaining a capability to prevent a military coup.
- Supporting liberation movements and "human rights struggles of the oppressed peoples of the world."

This final duty—an indication of an apparent intention to "export" the Islamic Revolution—caused much international publicity and special concern among Iran's neighbors with Shia Muslim populations. To date, however, the Guard has been too occupied with controlling domestic instability to become directly involved in foreign adventures. [redacted]

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[redacted] In sum, as its leaders have said, the Guard is to be always on call to respond to unexpected situations and to take on whatever tasks its leaders decide. Spokesmen have made clear that in any conflict between clerical and secular forces, the Guard will be solidly on the side of the clerics. [redacted]

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Ayatollah Khomeini assured Guard leaders in mid-October that he would not allow the Guard to be disbanded because its mission—to "keep the revolution alive and strong"—is too important. Characteristically, he did not expand on how the Guard was to carry out its mission, but he apparently was not thinking in terms of armed force because he added that the Guard's present focus on internal security missions in response to local disturbances is only temporary. Khomeini went on to underscore the Guard's personal tie to him by reminding its leaders that the Constitution would provide that in his capacity as head of state he would appoint the pasdaran commander. [redacted]

Khomeini's remarks complement those of Guard leaders, who have indicated that the force is seen as a pillar of the Islamic Movement whose function—in contrast to that of the regular security services—is to prepare the way, by force when necessary, for its own proselytizing of the citizenry. [redacted]

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Origin

The pasdaran concept seems to have originated among members of Khomeini's entourage long before the Shah was ousted. [redacted] figures who have held Guard leadership positions were associated with a Lebanese Shia paramilitary force while in exile or received Palestinian paramilitary training. The clerics in the Guard leadership appreciated the importance of Iranian anti-Shah militia groups—some Palestinian-trained—to their movement. Some may have been directly involved in obtaining that training for their associates. [redacted] establishing an armed propaganda force loyal to Khomeini and his views was also reinforced by other factors:

- Their individual personal ambitions.
- The disarray of the regular security forces and the belief within the Khomeini entourage that the loyalty of these forces would remain uncertain.
- The immediate threat presented by the well-armed leftists, pro-Shah groups, and independent paramilitary groups and private "armies."
- The serious disagreements within the clerical establishment and the Khomeini entourage over the proper structure of the new Iran.

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The first public announcement of the proposed force came on 20 February—a week after the collapse of the Bakhtiar government—when then Armed Forces Chief of Staff Qarani told the press that a "national guard" under Khomeini's authority would be formed in the next two days from reliable irregular groups to preserve internal order. A formal announcement of the Guard's existence, however, was not made until 5 and 6 May when brief news items were carried on Tehran radio. The timing of those announcements was probably related to the political and religious leaders' heightened sense of insecurity after the assassinations of General Qarani and Ayatollah Motahari—a confidant of Khomeini. Their increasing desire to disarm the general populace, especially the organized opposition, and control local governments also played a role. The announcements may also have signaled both a victory by those in the Khomeini entourage who had argued that a strong Guard was crucial for protecting the revolution and controlling the military, as well as an initial settlement of disagreements over the Guard's subordination and duties. [redacted]

Overall responsibility for organizing the force, then called the Revolutionary National Guard, was taken by then Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs (later Foreign Minister) Ebrahim Yazdi, who was emerging as the most influential Cabinet member.

[redacted] At the time, Yazdi reportedly was directing the main Revolutionary Committee in Tehran and coordinating relations with the Mujahedin, a polyglot irregular force that had been the armed wing of the pro-Khomeini opposition to the Shah, but had begun to fragment and show sympathy with the left after the Ayatollah came to power. [redacted]

The Deputy Prime Minister used the most loyal Mujahedin—some of whom had been trained in Lebanon by Palestinians—as the core of the first Guard units. And by mid-March he was able to field an "operational reserve" of Guards composed of former Mujahedin and ex-servicemen to control protesters in Tehran. The Mujahedin reportedly were told they would receive training only if they joined the Guard. At about the same time, however, senior political and religious leaders were becoming so concerned about their inability to influence the well-armed Mujahedin and leftist irregulars that Guard leaders announced that the Mujahedin could no longer serve as a pool for Guard recruits. [redacted]

[redacted] Guard leaders believed that associations with the Mujahedin and their "intellectual leaders" might cause the Guard to question Khomeini's ideas. [redacted]

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Yazdi, who has been described as monumentally ambitious, clearly saw the Guard as a way to advance Khomeini's cause, control the military, and strengthen his own position. But his efforts to establish the Guard on his own terms reportedly earned him the enmity of anti-Khomeini—and some pro-Khomeini—forces. Yazdi's abrasive approach to setting up the Guard program, as well as personal rivalries with Khomeini's entourage and a general proliferation of private armies, also prompted the appearance of other, much smaller pro-Khomeini paramilitary groups at about the same time.

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When he moved to the Foreign Ministry in April, Yazdi lost direct control over the Guard. Rivalries in the Khomeini entourage over control of the pasdaran may have been the cause of the four-month delay in confirming Mostafa Chamran as Deputy Prime Minister, even though Yazdi had indicated soon after his transfer that he expected Chamran to succeed him.

[redacted]

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Leadership

Before the fall of the Bazargan government, senior Guard spokesmen said that the force was governed by a seven-man board, appointed by Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council, which acted at the disposal of the Revolutionary Court, "under the supervision of the Council and in consultation with the government." Daily operations of the Guard were "controlled" by the two board members representing the Council and the government, but the Guard is not formally under the administrative or operational control of any ministry.

[redacted]

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Consultations with the government, [redacted] [redacted] did not indicate subordination to the Bazargan Cabinet even though some of its members—Yazdi and, later, Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Chamran—figured prominently in the Guard leadership. With regard to the pasdaran, its chain of command went through the Revolutionary Council—of which all three also were members—to Khomeini. The consultations, rather, involved requests for supplies, personnel, and funds from the government. [redacted]

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On 23 November, Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei was appointed the new "supervisor" of the Revolutionary Guards. [redacted]

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report indicated Khamenei is the "acting" commander—presumably until a new government is formed under the Islamic Constitution. Khamenei, a Revolutionary Council member and close adviser on defense issues to Khomeini, was named Deputy Defense Minister in July. He told an Iranian newsman on 5 December that his aims are to "expand, reinforce, train, and discipline" the pasdaran. [redacted]

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His predecessor as Guard Commander, Ayatollah Hasan Lahuti, about 62, resigned on 19 November citing "several" unspecified reasons and "heart trouble."

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[redacted] Lahuti apparently resigned his command and position because of his opposition to the attempt of Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party to monopolize the political scene and to the use of the Guard as a "political instrument" against the Muslim People's Republican Party associated with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. On 26 November the Guard's official spokesman told a Western newsman that Lahuti had resigned in "unclear circumstances" resulting from a power struggle in the Revolutionary Council. The Guard officer added that "Khamenei is fairly good, but Lahuti is older and more experienced. He has been with us from the beginning, and we would prefer that he had remained, but Khomeini wants otherwise." Lahuti had been active in organizing units throughout Iran. He had been called the Guard's "titular leader" and "director" and "religious leader," as well as Khomeini's "representative in charge" of the Guard. Lahuti has been characterized as a "good man" trusted by both Khomeini and the Guards. [redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted] . Khamenei's immediate subordinates are:

- Deputy Commander or Chief of Staff Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a Revolutionary Council member who became Deputy Interior Minister in July. He has occasionally been called the top Guard leader and its "operational director." [redacted]

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- Deputy Commander or Chief of Staff Ali Afruz, 33, a Western-trained scientist who was a protege of former Foreign Minister Yazdi. A devout Muslim loyal to Khomeini, [redacted]

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[redacted]

- Operations Commander Abas Zamani, 39, with the nom de guerre Abu Sharif, who may also be the force's training chief. [redacted]

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He has received wide press exposure. [redacted] By his own account, Abu Sharif may have spent 1970-72, as well as an unspecified period just before he joined Khomeini in Paris in late 1978, with the PLO in Lebanon. He has made several statements favoring close PLO-Iran ties. [redacted]

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[redacted] Trained as a teacher and translator, he speaks English and Arabic. Abu Sharif

is accompanied by bodyguards even at diplomatic functions.

- Deputy Operations Commander Javad Mansuri, who has publicly been labeled "Commander of the Corps of the Guard" and on at least one occasion—an official press report of a delegation visiting Khomeini—seemed to rank above Abu Sharif.
- Deputy Operations Commander (FNU) Jabrout, [redacted]
- Public Relations Director Yusef Farahman, known as Abu Forukan. (Like Abu Sharif this is a nom de guerre probably adopted while in exile in Lebanon, but it may also reflect mixed Persian-Lebanese Shia/Palestinian ancestry.) He has been identified both as one of Mansuri's seven deputies and one of Abu Sharif's five subordinates. [redacted]

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senior clerical and civilian leaders who have been associated with the Guard leadership include:

- Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi-Kani, a Revolutionary Council member called a "powerful figure" within the Guard and "Chief of the Guards in Tehran." He was the featured speaker at "Guard Day" ceremonies in Tehran on 28 June. Mahdavi-Kani maintains an office at the Guard's national headquarters in Tehran and was the official to whom parents of Guards killed in clashes with the Kurds directed protests. [redacted]

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- Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran, about 55, has been associated with the top Guard leadership since early 1979. He was widely recognized as its "leader" after he became Deputy Prime Minister in August. Chamran may not have gained Guard loyalty, however, because of his limited field military experience—with Lebanese Shia irregulars. Chamran claims two years of training in guerrilla warfare and

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organization in Egypt with Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh and former Foreign Minister Yazdi in 1963-65. He claims to have worked with the Lebanese Shias for several years after 1970. [redacted]

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[redacted]
ter. Although reappointed Defense Minister on 15 November, his overall status and role in the Guard leadership are uncertain. A US-trained electrical engineer, Chamran speaks English.

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- Mohammad Montazeri, about 55, the radical son of Ayatollah Hosein Montazeri, has been called "Deputy Commander" and a "leader" of Guards. [redacted]

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- Ahmad Khomeini, the Ayatollah's son, about 55, is claimed [redacted] to have some key role in the Guard leadership, possibly through the Qom training center. [redacted]

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Organization

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We have differing information on the structure of the Revolutionary Guard, [redacted]

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[redacted]
Over the past 10 months a picture has emerged of a force deeply influenced by clerics at all levels and designed primarily to be stationed in "population centers," however small, rather than in the "countryside." (The continuing Kurdish insurgency has, however, drawn ill-prepared Guard units into field operations in the northwest and led Islamic authorities to call for training of both Guard and Army units there in mountain warfare tactics.) [redacted]

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About 4,000 Guard personnel—excluding reserves—divided into units of some 200 men, are assigned to the force's Tehran headquarters at Sultanabad; 1,000 to 1,500 are assigned to the National Guard headquarters at the Majles building. About 250 of those at Sultanabad are headquarters staff and guards, while two other units of about the same size are "strike forces," well armed, skilled in urban combat, and trained by ex-Special Forces personnel. Some members of these elite units serve as staff and guards at Qasr Prison in northeast Tehran. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1C

About 500 well-disciplined former Air Force cadets serve as guards at key positions in Tehran and Qom. In the spring, the Tehran command also had access to the active and reserve militias of the dozen or so Tehran Revolutionary Committees. All of these men may by now have been brought formally into the Guard structure. [redacted] 25X1

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About 3,000 Guards are assigned to a training center at Aliabad, midway between Tehran and Qom; 3,000 to border checkpoints and other key locations; and 20,000 to provincial commands, [redacted]

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The force is organized and equipped on a regional basis, with regulars and reserves from a region, province, or town expected to serve in their home area once the Guard reaches full strength. (Disturbances among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans in the first

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
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Revolutionary Guards on duty
in West Azarbayan

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months of the Khomeini regime forced the Islamic authorities to draw on Guard units from outside the area, primarily from Tehran.) At present, most Guards are Persians

Although Guard leaders have said that the force would have a standard uniform with special insignia, pasdaran units have been seen in green or brown camouflage cloth as well as khaki uniforms. Those who put down the Arab disturbances wore "Islamic green" helmets. Within a unit, uniform accessories—belts, shoes, and hats—are often nonstandard. Such distinctions may reflect the availability of supplies, the various Guard subdivisions, and/or the preferences of the competing groups involved in training the force.

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Guard units are designed to be divided into military ("operations"), political ("ideological" and "public relations"), and economic units. Military units are subdivided into "shock" or "strike" forces, training cadres, and clerical VIP protection squads. Khomeini, for example, has three personal guards in addition to those who control the area around his home and office.

Although the Revolutionary Guard is theoretically open to men of ages from 16 to 60, its personnel are primarily "untainted volunteers" in their twenties, sponsored by clergy-controlled Revolutionary Committees, [redacted] These groups and 25X1C individuals probably are advancing trusted members or associates who will help them maintain control of their own bailiwicks. Guard leaders have said several times that the Revolutionary committees are expected eventually to become Guard administrative centers. Individuals who have been investigated and found 25X1C qualified, [redacted] would be expected to have, first, "correct and healthy Islamic beliefs" and to be honest, as well as to have at least a secondary

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divided into those scheduled to serve in provincial capitals and major towns—where around 1,000 Guards (depending on the local situation) will be stationed under the command of local Revolutionary Committees—or towns of up to 5,000 persons, where up to 200 Guards will be assigned. [redacted]

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education, no criminal or pro-Shah record, and good physical and mental health. A "youth regiment" (*Hang-e Javanan*) is being trained in Tehran, and a women's auxiliary may be considered. [redacted]

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Guards are to rely "90 percent on faith, 10 percent on force" and to consider safeguarding the revolution more important than "life or financial matters,"

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[redacted] Their length of service is to be indefinite, [redacted]

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[redacted] Guards are expected to serve mainly out of patriotism and enthusiasm and pay is limited to "essential needs," which must be strictly accounted for. Others have reported that Guards receive about \$35 per month plus food, 25X1C lodging, and clothing; that members of elite, fast-reaction units in Tehran get \$800 per month, while others—presumably also based in Tehran—get \$500 per month; or that pay varies from \$370 to \$860 per month. [redacted]

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[redacted] Guards would be considered "officially recruited" after completing a "10-day-and-night" course with 15 to 16 hours of instruction a day—four to five of which would be devoted to ideological instruction. [redacted]

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Forukan, speaking in mid-June at the Guard leaders' first press conference, added that the training program would provide such positive guidance that Guards would never have to act without understanding the purpose behind their orders. [redacted]

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Initially the Revolutionary Guard was financed by the government—although some local committees apparently contributed to units in their area the confiscated assets of former officials and others associated with the Shah's regime. [redacted]

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Guard spokesmen had consistently insisted that the financial dependence of the Guard on the government would be broken off if it became restrictive. In late September, the Revolutionary Council approved an "independent budget" of about \$3 million for the force, designed to enable it to acquire "necessary" equipment, including vehicles and helicopters, without routing requests through the civilian and military bureaucracies. The move also coincided with a decision to broaden the Guard's internal security duties. [redacted]

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A large, empty rectangular frame with a thick black border, representing a placeholder for a figure or diagram.

A diagram consisting of a large outer rectangle. Inside, there are two horizontal rectangles: a longer one at the top and a shorter one below it. The shorter rectangle is positioned such that its left edge aligns with the left edge of the longer one. A small vertical line segment is located on the left side of the frame, near the bottom edge.

Training by the Iranian Military

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Guard leaders began to negotiate a training program

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Guard leaders and military representatives discussed several alternative training programs drawn up by the armed forces. The military proposed a plan calling for a total of 50,000 Guards over the next two to three years, but Guard leaders agreed to only 20,000—possibly to minimize outside influence on the force. The first 10,000 trainees were to come from units already 25

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formed in Tehran, and a four-week training program apparently began [redacted]

[redacted] heavy equipment—larger mortars, artillery up to 203-mm, and M-48 tanks—reportedly were authorized for the Guard arsenal, probably in response to the force's experience against the Kurds and to high-level decisions on the role of the regular and paramilitary armed forces giving the Guard broader responsibilities in internal security. [redacted]

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Capabilities

Not surprisingly for a force being shaken up from top to bottom, subjected to the demands of rival political cliques, and attacked—verbally and physically—on many sides, the Revolutionary Guard's ability to fulfill its mission is limited. It is likely to remain so until the Iranian political situation stabilizes. [redacted]

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By mid-June, the Guard had formally established units in 29 cities [redacted]

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[redacted] and was soon to be operating in 40 other cities. But command and control have remained tenuous, and the quality of personnel is uneven. The several-hundred-man elite units in Tehran seem to be a relatively disciplined, expert force—probably because they are trained by or even composed of former Special Forces personnel. Other units based in Tehran are probably better trained than their counterparts in the provinces, and some scattered local commanders may have been able to pull together units that can be effective on a small scale. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Guard's chief weakness is an "acute shortage" of experienced instructors—a complaint voiced by Guard officials since they began organizing the force. [redacted]

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[redacted] enthusiastic youths—many of whom had two years of military service as draftees under the Shah's regime—had joined the pasdaran, but they remain too inexperienced and undisciplined to form an effective, reliable force under the Guard's present structure. [redacted]

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The Guards—predominantly Farsi-speakers—seem at best to be unsympathetic to local mores and at worst systematically brutal.

Khomeini's representative in Tabriz, who was assassinated a month later, publicly deplored the conduct of Guards in that city.

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The Guard's problems are not likely to be alleviated by its cooperation with the regular security services, with which its relations are admittedly not good. Most military officials at all levels have made abundantly clear that they want nothing to do with the pasdaran. The Guards, on the other hand, complain that military indifference has multiplied their vulnerability to dissidents. Most military units have taken a neutral stand toward Iran's internal problems unless forced by

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Despite continuing local and national campaigns to weed undesirable elements out of Guard units and establish an effective chain of command, the activities of Guards and others posing as Guards have created disturbances throughout Iran, especially in minority areas. In some cases, the Khomeini regime has been able to restore calm only by removing, or promising to remove the Guards

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the Khomeini regime to act against insurgents. [redacted]

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Guard units have commandeered security forces equipment, interfered in their operations, created dissension among security force personnel, issued unauthorized orders to military units, and refused to cooperate with local commanders. [redacted] 25X1

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25X1 The Guard is also subject to the logistic difficulties that plague the armed forces. Military units running low on equipment and with limited repair capabilities are loathe to transfer any to the pasdaran. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Such problems—especially orders to fire on civilians and their own unexpected casualties in clashes with ethnic dissidents—seem to have seriously undermined pasdaran morale and recruitment. Despite the determination and enthusiasm of many of its leaders and troops, the Revolutionary Guard will for the foreseeable future remain unable to carry out effectively most of the mission envisaged for it. [redacted]

25X1

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